International Law & the Hormuz Conflict
Nuclear plants, desalination facilities, bridges, oil refineries, military bases, merchant ships. As both sides strike targets the other calls civilian, the same accusation — violation of international law — is being levelled in both directions. This page explains the legal framework, applies it to the specific targets struck in this conflict, and assesses where each side stands.
Important Note
This page provides factual information about international humanitarian law and its application to publicly reported events. It does not constitute legal advice. IHL assessments in active conflicts are inherently contested — the assessments below reflect the weight of publicly available legal analysis, not binding legal determinations. War crimes can only be formally established through judicial proceedings.
The Scale of the Legal Questions
What Is International Humanitarian Law?
International humanitarian law — also called the law of armed conflict or the laws of war — is the body of rules that applies during armed conflict. Its purpose is to limit the effects of armed conflict by protecting people who are not or are no longer participating in hostilities, and by restricting the means and methods of warfare.
The primary sources of IHL are the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols (1977), customary international law as codified by the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The United States has not ratified Additional Protocol I but is generally considered bound by its customary law provisions. Iran has ratified Additional Protocol I.
A breach of IHL does not automatically constitute a war crime. War crimes require proof of intent — deliberate targeting of protected persons or objects, or wilful disregard of civilian harm known to be disproportionate. Proving this during an active conflict is extremely difficult. Accountability, if it comes, typically follows years after hostilities end.
The Six Core Principles
These are the foundational rules that govern every targeting decision in the Hormuz conflict. Both sides invoke them to justify their own strikes and condemn the other's.
Distinction
IHL Customary Rule 1 / Geneva Convention API Art. 48Parties to a conflict must always distinguish between civilians and combatants, and between civilian objects and military objectives. Only military objectives may be attacked.
Relevance to this conflict
The central principle in every dispute over infrastructure targeting in this conflict. Both sides claim they are hitting military objectives. Both sides claim the other is hitting civilian objects.
Proportionality
IHL Customary Rule 14 / Geneva Convention API Art. 51(5)(b)An attack is prohibited if it may be expected to cause incidental civilian harm that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
Relevance to this conflict
Even if a target has military value, the attack is unlawful if civilian harm is disproportionate. A commander must assess this before striking. The assessment is almost never made public.
Precaution
IHL Customary Rule 15 / Geneva Convention API Art. 57Those who plan or decide upon an attack must take all feasible precautions to avoid or minimise incidental civilian harm. This includes timing, weapon choice, and target selection.
Relevance to this conflict
Strikes on facilities serving dual civilian-military purposes — like desalination plants near military bases — require demonstrated precautionary measures. These are rarely verifiable from outside.
Objects Indispensable to Civilian Survival
IHL Customary Rule 54 / Geneva Convention API Art. 54Attacking, destroying, removing or rendering useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population is prohibited. This explicitly includes foodstuffs, agricultural areas, drinking water installations, and irrigation works.
Relevance to this conflict
Desalination plants — which supply the majority of drinking water for Gulf populations — fall squarely within this protection. Both US strikes on Iranian water infrastructure and Iranian strikes on Gulf desalination plants raise direct questions under this rule.
Protection of Works Containing Dangerous Forces
IHL Customary Rule 42 / Geneva Convention API Art. 56Dams, dykes, and nuclear electrical generating stations must not be made the object of attack, even where they are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population.
Relevance to this conflict
This is the rule most directly applicable to strikes on Bushehr and Darkhovin. The protection applies even if the facility has military significance — the release of dangerous forces (radiation) is specifically prohibited. The IAEA has invoked this principle explicitly.
Humanity
Martens Clause / Geneva Convention PreamblesEven where specific IHL rules do not cover a situation, civilians remain protected by the principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience. This catch-all applies where treaty law is silent.
Relevance to this conflict
Invoked when novel weapons or targeting methods fall outside existing treaty provisions. Relevant to the use of ballistic missiles in densely populated areas and the deliberate targeting of water supply infrastructure.
Target-by-Target Assessment
Each target type in this conflict carries its own legal analysis. The assessments below present both sides' arguments and an overall status based on publicly available legal analysis.
Darkhovin Nuclear Power Plant (under construction)
Justification Given
US position: Darkhovin is a future nuclear weapons-related facility and therefore a legitimate military objective. The IAEA confirmed the site contained no nuclear material and was in very early construction stages as of its last inspection. No radiological risk was present at the time of the strike.
Legal Challenge
Iran and the AEOI position: Darkhovin falls under IAEA comprehensive safeguards. Striking a facility under international nuclear safeguards is a violation of international law regardless of its construction status. The attack targets Iran's right to peaceful nuclear energy.
IAEA / UN Position
The IAEA confirmed the site was in early construction stages, contained no nuclear material when last visited, and poses no radiological risk. The IAEA Director General called for maximum restraint and is investigating.
Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (operational)
Justification Given
No official US justification for Bushehr strikes has been published. An Al Jazeera investigation found strikes extensively damaged the plant — Iran's only operating nuclear power station. The plant reportedly remains functional with stable radiation levels.
Legal Challenge
IHL Customary Rule 42 / API Article 56 provides specific protection for nuclear electrical generating stations, even if they are military objectives, when an attack may cause the release of dangerous forces. An operating reactor represents exactly this scenario. This protection is among the strongest in international humanitarian law.
IAEA / UN Position
IAEA Director General Grossi has repeatedly called for maximum restraint and urged all parties to refrain from attacks on nuclear facilities. The IAEA has been monitoring the situation at Bushehr closely.
Desalination plants (Gulf states — Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE)
Justification Given
IRGC position: the facilities struck are near or supply US military installations, giving them military significance. Iran has consistently characterised its strikes as targeting US military assets, not civilian infrastructure.
Legal Challenge
Gulf states' position: the plants serve civilian populations almost exclusively. Kuwait derives over 90% of its drinking water from desalination. Bahrain and the UAE are similarly dependent. IHL Customary Rule 54 explicitly protects drinking water installations from attack. Repeated strikes on the same facilities (Shuaiba struck twice) suggest deliberate targeting rather than incidental damage.
IAEA / UN Position
The UN Secretary General has condemned attacks on civilian infrastructure. The IMO has called for an end to attacks on maritime and civilian infrastructure.
Desalination plants (Iran — Bunji, Jask, others)
Justification Given
US position: strikes target military logistics infrastructure. Bandar Abbas and nearby facilities serve Iran's IRGC naval operations and mine-laying capabilities. Water and power infrastructure supporting military operations may be legitimate military objectives.
Legal Challenge
The Bunji strike left 20 villages without water. Civilian populations depending on a facility for survival are specifically protected under IHL Rule 54 regardless of any incidental military use of the facility.
Bridges and road infrastructure (southern Iran)
Justification Given
US position: bridges and roads near Bandar Abbas serve IRGC naval logistics — moving mine-laying equipment, fast boats, and surveillance assets toward the strait. Disrupting this network is a legitimate military objective with concrete military advantage.
Legal Challenge
The same bridges serve civilian transport in communities throughout southern Iran. AP footage shows destroyed bridges in civilian areas not obviously connected to military logistics. IHL requires the primary use of the facility to be military — not merely incidental military use alongside predominant civilian use.
US military bases in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Jordan, UAE, Oman
Justification Given
Military bases hosting foreign military forces are legitimate military objectives under IHL. Iran characterises all its strikes as targeting US military assets. Military personnel and equipment are combatants and military objects respectively.
Legal Challenge
Some strikes have caused civilian casualties and property damage in areas surrounding bases. A child was injured in Doha from falling debris. One crew member killed on a UAE tanker in Omani territorial waters. Proportionality assessment required for each strike.
Commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz
Justification Given
Iran's position: vessels transiting via the southern Omani corridor without Iranian coordination are violating the MOU framework and Iranian maritime management authority. The IRGC characterises some vessels as linked to Israeli or US interests.
Legal Challenge
Merchant shipping and civilian crews have specific protections under the law of armed conflict at sea (San Remo Manual). Attacks on neutral commercial vessels without warning, opportunity to evacuate, or evidence of direct military support are prohibited. 12 seafarers have been killed or gone missing since the crisis began.
IAEA / UN Position
The IMO has condemned attacks on merchant shipping and called for an immediate end to hostilities affecting commercial navigation.
Why Accountability Is So Difficult
The US is not a member of the ICC
The International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over war crimes committed by nationals of member states or on the territory of member states. The United States withdrew its signature from the Rome Statute in 2002. American service members and commanders cannot be prosecuted by the ICC without a UN Security Council referral — which Russia and China would veto.
The UN Security Council is paralysed
Any binding Security Council resolution on the conflict — including referral to the ICC, imposition of sanctions, or authorisation of a monitoring mission — requires unanimity among the five permanent members. Russia and China have already vetoed resolutions on this conflict. The US would veto any resolution targeting its own conduct.
Evidence is inaccessible during active conflict
Establishing a war crime requires proof of intent — that the strike was deliberately aimed at protected persons or objects, or that civilian harm was knowingly disproportionate. This evidence — targeting files, communications, pre-strike assessments — is classified military material that only becomes available years after the conflict, if ever.
Both sides accuse the other simultaneously
When both parties to a conflict accuse each other of war crimes simultaneously, political will for accountability is almost impossible to generate. Any international body that indicts one side faces immediate accusations of political bias from the other. The result is typically impunity for both.
The IAEA has no enforcement power
The International Atomic Energy Agency can investigate, report, and call for restraint. It cannot sanction, prosecute, or physically prevent strikes on nuclear facilities. Its moral authority is significant but its legal enforcement capacity is zero.
What the IAEA Has Said
The International Atomic Energy Agency has been the most active international body in responding to nuclear-related strikes in this conflict. Its statements carry significant weight even without enforcement power.
March 2026
Following the first strikes near Bushehr, IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi called for "maximum restraint to prevent nuclear safety risks during the conflict" and confirmed the IAEA was monitoring the situation.
July 19, 2026
Following the Darkhovin strike, the IAEA confirmed the facility was in very early construction stages, contained no nuclear material when last visited, and poses no radiological risk. The IAEA said it is investigating and reiterated its call for restraint.
Ongoing
The IAEA has confirmed that Bushehr — Iran's only operating nuclear power plant — sustained extensive damage in US strikes. The plant reportedly remains functional with stable radiation levels. The IAEA continues to monitor nuclear safety across all affected facilities.