Key Actors
The individuals, organisations, and governments driving the 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis — who they are, what they want, and what to watch.
Actor Groups
Iran
Mojtaba Khamenei
IRANSupreme Leader of Iran
Role
Iran's supreme decision-maker. Took power following the death of his father Ali Khamenei in circumstances not yet fully disclosed publicly. His consolidation of authority over the IRGC is incomplete — a critical factor in whether Iran's negotiators can deliver on any deal they sign.
Current Position
Has not spoken publicly about the MOU negotiations. Domestic messaging emphasises resistance and sovereignty. His silence on the nuclear concessions being discussed in Doha is itself a signal that the IRGC hardliner position has not been overruled.
Red Lines
Iran's right to nuclear enrichment — described as "inalienable"
No foreign control or oversight of the Strait of Hormuz
No surrender of enriched uranium stockpile to the United States
Watch For
Any direct public statement on the nuclear terms. His endorsement — or silence — will determine whether Iran's negotiators can close a deal.
Abbas Araghchi
IRANForeign Minister of Iran
Role
Iran's chief diplomatic face throughout the crisis. Experienced nuclear negotiator — he was part of the team that negotiated the original 2015 JCPOA. Has conducted marathon shuttle diplomacy: Islamabad, Muscat, Beijing, Moscow, Doha. Pragmatist by reputation, operating within hard constraints set by the IRGC and the Supreme Leader.
Current Position
Has consistently insisted that the Strait of Hormuz is under Iranian management and that any transit coordination must go through Iranian naval authorities. Has separated the Hormuz question from the nuclear file in public statements — Iran's preferred sequencing.
Red Lines
Lifting of the US naval blockade before any nuclear concessions
Iranian sovereignty over strait management acknowledged in any agreement
No direct negotiations with the United States — only through mediators
Watch For
His body language after Doha talks. When Araghchi gives interviews describing talks as "positive," deal progress is real. When he emphasises red lines, it is not.
Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf
IRANParliamentary Speaker / Chief Negotiator
Role
Former IRGC commander and Tehran mayor. As Parliamentary Speaker, represents the hardliner strand of the Iranian system — close to the Revolutionary Guard, sceptical of Western intentions. Has been Iran's most hawkish public voice throughout the negotiations, repeatedly warning that the strait will not reopen under pressure.
Current Position
"The Americans must either submit to diplomacy and our conditions or submit to the power of our missiles." Opposes any agreement that does not include full US acknowledgement of Iranian sovereignty over the strait. His support — or at minimum his silence — is required for any deal to hold domestically.
Red Lines
Full US recognition of Iranian maritime sovereignty
War reparations from the United States
No foreign mine-clearing operations without Iranian coordination
Watch For
If Ghalibaf goes quiet or travels abroad, hardliner resistance to a deal may be softening. If he escalates his rhetoric, a deal is likely being blocked internally.
IRGC Navy
IRANIslamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy
Role
The operational force controlling the Strait of Hormuz. Responsible for mine-laying, small boat attacks, ship seizures, and drone strikes throughout the crisis. Answers to the Supreme Leader rather than the elected government — a structural fact that complicates any deal that the Araghchi-led diplomatic track negotiates.
Current Position
Has continued military operations — including fresh mine deployments and small boat attacks — even during ceasefire periods and active negotiations. Has created the "Persian Gulf Strait Authority" to formalise Iranian control over transit coordination.
Red Lines
No foreign mine-clearing operations without IRGC Navy coordination
Maintenance of Iranian naval presence throughout the strait
Veto over any transit arrangement that removes IRGC leverage
Watch For
Mine-laying activity. Any fresh IRGC mine deployment after a deal is announced would signal that the Revolutionary Guard is not bound by what the diplomatic track agreed.
United States
Donald Trump
USPresident of the United States
Role
Launched Operation Epic Fury on February 28. Has oscillated throughout the crisis between maximalist military threats and deal-making optimism. Faces significant domestic pressure: gas at $4.56/gallon, bond market turbulence, and congressional war powers challenges. Has repeatedly announced deals are "close" or "largely negotiated" before they materialised.
Current Position
"Relief for performance" — the blockade loosens proportionately as the strait opens and Iran delivers on mine clearing. Has stated Iran "can never have a nuclear weapon" as a non-negotiable. Called off a planned strike at Gulf allies' request in May, saying "hopefully, maybe forever."
Red Lines
Iran cannot obtain or develop a nuclear weapon
Strait must reopen without tolls or Iranian sovereignty claims
Enriched uranium stockpile must be removed from Iranian territory
Watch For
Truth Social posts. Trump's public framing of deal progress has consistently preceded (and sometimes contradicted) the actual state of negotiations. A post claiming a "GREAT DEAL" is close — watch for Iran's response within hours.
Marco Rubio
USSecretary of State
Role
The day-to-day architect of US diplomatic strategy. Has maintained a harder line than Trump on the nuclear issue — consistently insisting that enrichment cessation and uranium surrender are non-negotiable. Attended the NATO summit in Sweden in late May while simultaneously managing the Iran channel, signalling the US is conducting multiple diplomatic tracks simultaneously.
Current Position
"This problem will be solved one way or the other" — either through diplomacy or through resumed military operations. Has described slight progress in talks while refusing to exaggerate it. Authorised the Maritime Freedom Construct.
Red Lines
Iran's nuclear programme must be addressed in any comprehensive agreement
Blockade remains until deal is "reached, certified, and signed"
No sanctions relief before verified strait reopening
Watch For
Rubio's travel schedule. When he is in the region or meeting mediators directly, talks are active. When he describes progress as "slight," expect more days of negotiation.
Steve Witkoff & Jared Kushner
USUS Special Envoys
Role
Trump's personal envoys conducting direct and indirect negotiations with Iranian counterparts. Witkoff has previous Middle East deal-making experience from the Gaza ceasefire negotiations. Kushner brings the personal relationship with Trump that gives envoy commitments credibility with the other side. Their Islamabad trip was cancelled in late April — a significant signal of frustration with the pace of Pakistani mediation.
Current Position
Have been the primary conduits for the MOU text negotiations. Operating under Trump's "relief for performance" framework. Sources indicate they are the authors of the "no dust, no dollars" formulation.
Watch For
Any confirmed travel to the region. Witkoff or Kushner appearing in Doha, Muscat, or Islamabad means active negotiations are at a critical stage.
Mediators
Pakistan (Shehbaz Sharif / Asim Munir)
MEDIATORPrimary Mediator
Role
Pakistan has served as the primary diplomatic go-between throughout the crisis — hosting talks in Islamabad, carrying messages between Washington and Tehran, and providing the channel through which Iran's formal responses have been delivered. PM Shehbaz Sharif and Army Chief General Asim Munir have both been personally engaged. Pakistan's credibility with both sides — it has relations with Iran and is a US security partner — makes it the indispensable mediator.
Current Position
"Our hope and expectation is for an agreement sooner rather than later." Optimistic in public statements. Has reported "encouraging" progress after 24-hour talks in Tehran in late May.
Watch For
Pakistani foreign ministry statements after mediator sessions. "Generally positive" means talks are alive. "Sticking points remain" means the gap is still wide.
Oman (Sultan Haitham bin Tariq)
MEDIATORBack-Channel Mediator
Role
Oman has historically served as the quiet back-channel between Washington and Tehran — it hosted the secret talks that preceded the 2015 JCPOA. Sultan Haitham met Araghchi in late April, producing what Iranian officials described as "some agreements" on the strait. Oman's geographical position — it owns coastline on the strait — gives it unique standing in any arrangement for post-deal transit management.
Current Position
Publicly neutral. Privately active. Has been under pressure from the UAE to choose a side rather than mediate — pressure it has so far resisted.
Watch For
Araghchi flying to Muscat. Omani visits by Iranian officials almost always precede diplomatic movement. The Omani channel is where the most sensitive messages travel.
Multinational Coalition
United Kingdom & France
COALITIONNorthwood Coalition Co-Leaders
Role
Led the 38-nation Northwood coalition planning the post-ceasefire freedom-of-navigation mission. The UK's Permanent Joint Headquarters at Northwood is the planning centre for mine-clearing and naval escort operations. France has pledged 10 warships including assets from the Charles de Gaulle carrier strike group — the coalition's largest single naval contribution.
Current Position
The mission begins only after a sustainable ceasefire is agreed. France has attached two preconditions: an Iranian non-fire pledge and a US commitment to allow open passage. Neither has been formally met. The Charles de Gaulle began moving toward the southern Red Sea in mid-May as a signal of readiness.
Red Lines
Mission is strictly defensive — force used only in self-defence
Will not operate under US command (Northwood uses UK national command structure)
France will not deploy until its two preconditions are met
Watch For
Charles de Gaulle position. If it moves from the Red Sea into the Gulf of Oman, a deal is imminent or has been signed.
Regional Powers
China (Xi Jinping / Wang Yi)
REGIONALStrategic Leverage Holder
Role
China is Iran's most important economic partner and the world's largest crude importer, sourcing ~60% of its oil through the Strait of Hormuz. Has maintained a studied neutrality throughout the crisis while quietly maintaining oil purchases from Iran in defiance of US sanctions. Met Araghchi in Beijing in early May. Trump met Xi at the Beijing summit on May 13–15.
Current Position
Xi offered to help broker peace and assured Trump that China would not provide military equipment to Iran. China's own Foreign Ministry readout of the Beijing summit made no mention of Iran or Hormuz. China is getting something it wants — US concessions on Taiwan and trade — in exchange for whatever pressure it is privately applying to Tehran.
Red Lines
Will not be seen as Washington's enforcement mechanism against Iran
Opposes any arrangement that reduces Chinese access to Gulf energy
Insists on maintaining its Iran oil trade channel regardless of US sanctions
Watch For
Wang Yi's calls to Araghchi. When Beijing is actively applying pressure on Tehran, the frequency and tone of Chinese-Iranian foreign minister contact changes. Also watch for any reduction in Chinese oil purchases from Iran — that would be the most powerful signal China can send.
Saudi Arabia & UAE
REGIONALGulf Stakeholders
Role
The Gulf states most exposed to the crisis and most invested in its resolution. Both have absorbed Iranian attacks on their infrastructure during the conflict — including the UAE's Fujairah oil facility and desalination plants in Kuwait. Both asked Trump to call off the May 20 planned strike, believing a deal was close. Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince MBS reportedly refused to allow US forces to use Saudi airspace for Project Freedom.
Current Position
Want the crisis resolved diplomatically but on terms that permanently reduce Iran's strategic leverage over the waterway. UAE and Saudi Arabia are pulling in slightly different directions: Riyadh is more cautious about escalation; Abu Dhabi, having absorbed more direct Iranian attacks, is more hawkish.
Red Lines
Iran must not retain recognised sovereignty over the strait
No deal that leaves Iran's missile programme and proxy networks intact
Gulf state interests must be represented in any transit management arrangement
Watch For
MBS or UAE leadership calls with Trump. When Gulf leaders are calling Washington to urge restraint, they believe a deal is genuinely close. When they go quiet, they have given up on the current negotiating track.