One Page, Fourteen Points, Thirty Days: The Deal That Could End the Hormuz Crisis

Sixty-eight days after the United States and Israel launched strikes on Iran, the two sides are closer to ending the war than they have ever been. Not because of military pressure alone, or because of coalition-building in London suburbs, or because of a two-day naval operation in the strait. But because of a single sheet of paper with fourteen points on it.

The one-page memorandum of understanding now circulating between Washington and Tehran — confirmed by Pakistani mediators, two U.S. officials, and multiple sources briefed on the negotiations — is the most significant diplomatic document of this crisis. Iran was expected to deliver its response today. Nothing has been agreed. But sources close to the mediation used words not heard in this conflict before: "We will close this very soon. We are getting close."

This post explains what the MOU actually contains, where the gaps remain, and what it means for the Strait of Hormuz if it is — or isn't — signed.

What the MOU Is — and What It Isn't

The first thing to understand about the memorandum is what it does not do.

It does not reopen the strait. It does not end the U.S. blockade. It does not resolve the nuclear question. It does not address Iran's missile programme, its support for regional proxies, or Israel's security concerns. It does not provide the "complete and final agreement" that Trump has repeatedly described as his objective.

What it does is create the conditions for all of those things to be negotiated — by declaring a formal end to the war and starting the clock on a 30-day period of detailed talks to reach a comprehensive deal.

Think of it as a framework for a framework. A commitment to negotiate, not a negotiated outcome.

That framing matters enormously for how the MOU should be read. It is not a peace deal. It is an agreement to pursue one — and history is littered with agreements to pursue peace that fell apart in the pursuing.

What's Actually on the Table

The MOU is being negotiated between Trump's envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner and several Iranian officials, both directly and through Pakistani mediators. In its current form, the 14-point document covers five core areas:

1. End of hostilities. The MOU would formally declare the war — Operation Epic Fury, as the U.S. military campaign was designated — at an end. Secretary of State Rubio already declared the operation "concluded" on Tuesday, which represents a significant shift in Washington's framing.

2. The Strait of Hormuz. Both sides would gradually lift their competing blockades during the 30-day negotiation period. Iran's restrictions on commercial shipping and the U.S. naval blockade of Iranian ports would ease in parallel, not sequentially. This is the provision most relevant to global energy markets and the 2,000 stranded vessels still waiting to move.

3. Nuclear enrichment moratorium. Iran would commit to a moratorium on uranium enrichment. The duration is the most actively contested point in the entire document. Washington initially demanded 20 years. Tehran offered 5. Sources briefed on the current state of talks put the likely landing point at 12 to 15 years. After the moratorium expires, Iran would be permitted to resume enrichment up to 3.67% — the level permitted under the original 2015 JCPOA.

4. The uranium stockpile. This is the sharpest sticking point. Iran currently holds more than 400kg of uranium enriched to near-weapons-grade — a stockpile that did not exist in anything like this quantity before the war. The U.S. has demanded it be removed from Iranian territory. The option currently being discussed is transferring the material to the United States. One complication: Trump told Netanyahu in their most recent call that without agreement on where the stockpile goes, there is no deal.

5. Sanctions relief and frozen funds. The U.S. would commit to gradually lifting sanctions on Iran and releasing billions of dollars in frozen Iranian assets — including the $6 billion that was unblocked in 2023 as part of a prisoner exchange and subsequently frozen again.

What the MOU Does Not Cover

Three significant items are conspicuously absent from what has been reported.

Iran's ballistic missile programme — one of Washington's stated objectives at the start of Operation Epic Fury — does not appear in the MOU framework. This is a major concession from the original U.S. position, and Israel has explicitly flagged restriction of Iran's ballistic capabilities as a red line.

Iran's support for proxy militias — Hezbollah, the Houthis, Iraqi factions — is similarly absent. The U.S. declared at the outset that severing this support was a war aim. It does not appear to be a condition of the MOU.

Israel's position is unresolved. Netanyahu convened his security cabinet on Wednesday after news of the MOU broke, and Israeli analysts have outlined four core red lines: dismantling enrichment infrastructure, restricting ballistic missiles, preventing Hezbollah and Hamas from being rebuilt, and ensuring Iran gains no political legitimacy from the deal. The current MOU framework appears to address, at best, one of these four.

Iran's state media, meanwhile, has been carefully managing expectations domestically. The ISNA news agency — which is not linked to the IRGC — dismissed Western reports about the MOU as "media speculation" and emphasised that Iranian negotiators are discussing the end of the war, not the nuclear issue. That framing is significant: it suggests Tehran is trying to ratify the Hormuz-first, nuclear-later sequencing it has always preferred, without publicly acknowledging the nuclear concessions being discussed behind closed doors.

The Fracture Risk

Every previous moment of optimism in this crisis has been followed by collapse. Washington has expressed confidence about a deal at multiple points — most notably in mid-April, when the ceasefire announcement sent crude down 10% before IRGC gunboats started firing on ships within 24 hours.

The structural risk this time is the same as before, but with a specific new dimension: the IRGC.

Iran's new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, took power in extraordinarily difficult circumstances and has not yet consolidated control over the Revolutionary Guard in the way his father had. The IRGC controls Iran's nuclear programme, its missile forces, and its maritime operations in the strait. It also controls the Tasnim news agency, which has been silent on the nuclear provisions of the MOU.

The hardliners inside the IRGC have a strong interest in preventing any deal that removes the enriched uranium stockpile from Iranian soil. That stockpile is Iran's most powerful deterrent — arguably more valuable to the IRGC as leverage than as an actual weapon. Surrendering it, even to a nominally neutral third party, is something the Guard's leadership will resist fiercely.

The scenario most feared by U.S. negotiators is not an Iranian government rejection of the MOU — it is an Iranian government that signals acceptance while the IRGC quietly blocks implementation. That is how the original JCPOA eroded, in the view of many American officials. It could happen again.

What It Means for the Strait

If the MOU is signed and the 30-day period begins, the Strait of Hormuz will not immediately reopen.

The gradual, parallel lifting of blockades envisioned by the framework is not the same as the instant restoration of commercial traffic. Insurance underwriters will not certify the waterway as safe until mines are cleared, Iranian naval activity subsides, and the security situation has demonstrably stabilised. That process takes weeks at minimum.

What a signed MOU would do is change the risk calculus for ship operators and insurers almost immediately. The announcement effect — even before a single mine is cleared — could send war risk premiums sharply lower. Oil prices have already moved: Brent crude fell around 11% on news of the MOU negotiations, touching $98 a barrel for the first time since the crisis began. That is the market pricing in a non-trivial probability of a deal.

The Northwood coalition and the U.S. Maritime Freedom Construct are both positioned to move quickly once a deal framework exists. France's Charles de Gaulle carrier strike group began heading toward the southern Red Sea on Wednesday, in what Macron's office described as a signal that Paris is "ready and capable" of securing the strait. The multinational mine-clearing operation that has been in planning for weeks could begin within days of an MOU being signed — compressing the recovery timeline that would otherwise stretch into months.

The 48-Hour Window

Iran was expected to deliver its response to Pakistani mediators today. That response will determine whether this crisis enters its endgame or returns to stalemate.

There are three realistic scenarios.

The first is that Iran accepts the MOU framework in substance, negotiations move to Islamabad or Geneva, and the 30-day clock starts. Oil markets rally. Ships begin to move cautiously. The hard work of turning a framework into a final agreement begins — and with it, all the ways it could still unravel.

The second is that Iran signals conditional acceptance — agreeing to some points, rejecting others, and sending the document back for further revision. This extends the diplomatic track without breaking it. The strait remains closed. Markets stay volatile. The MOU becomes a rolling negotiation rather than a signed framework.

The third is that the IRGC hardliners prevail internally, Tehran rejects the uranium provisions, and the MOU collapses. Trump has been explicit about what happens next: "If they don't agree, the bombing starts, and it will be, sadly, at a much higher level and intensity than it was before."

The Hormuz Strait Monitor will update as Iran's response becomes known.

Track real-time vessel movements, energy prices, and diplomatic developments at the Hormuz Strait Monitor dashboard.